China’s Arctic Strategy and Hybrid Warfare: Targeting Governance and Strategic Responses

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Gao Feng, China’s Arctic Ambassador at the Arctic Circle Forum in Tórshavn, Faroe Islands in May 2018. Photo: Arctic Circle

The Arctic Institute China Series 2025

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China’s Arctic strategy is a hybrid warfare campaign that combines overt and covert means to expand influence and reshape Arctic governance. This essay addresses the question: how is China leveraging International Organizations (IO’s) to expand its strategic and economic influence in the Arctic, and what implications does this have for regional security and governance? This analysis applies the Hybrid Centre of Excellence (CoE) framework by elucidating how China’s hybrid tactics have been employed to undermine the Arctic Council’s governance efficacy, particularly following China’s implicit backing of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, it assesses alternative opportunities of IO’s through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structural constraints under Article 6 that limit proactive Arctic engagement, and proposes four comprehensive policy pathways.

China’s Hybrid Warfare Against the Arctic Council Post-Ukraine War

The Arctic Council, composed of eight Arctic states (Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Greenland, Canada, the United States of America, Norway, and Russia), serves as the dominant governance forum for the region. China holds observer status, but has no voting rights or direct decision-making power.¹⁾Puranen, M., Kopra, S., 2023. China’s Arctic Strategy – a Comprehensive Approach in Times of Great Power Rivalry. Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 6, 239–253. https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.196 In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Arctic Council experienced a de facto paralysis as Western Arctic states paused their participation with Russia. China’s hybrid strategy to become a polar great power via economic, scientific, and military means²⁾Bouffard, T., 2024. Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Arctic States, China, NATO, and the EU. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/iks/sharing%20public/arctic-narratives-and-political-values-updated-final.pdf. Accessed 1 December 2025 has exploited this fracture because of its refusal to condemn Russia’s actions, and its continued economic and political cooperation with Moscow has weakened the Arctic Council’s unity and legitimacy. By aligning with Russia (an Arctic state) on matters such as deepening bilateral cooperation in resource exploitation, infrastructure development, military partnerships, and scientific research, China simultaneously positions itself as a supporter of an Arctic Council member that regularly violates international law, thus impairing the Council’s capacity to pursue justice or coordinated responses to violations.³⁾Lange-Ionatamišvili, E. & Allan, I., 2018. Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Russia, China and Canada in the High North. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/arctic-narratives-and-political-values-russia-china-and-canada-in-the-high-north/116. Accessed 1 December 2025 This evolving partnership was illuminated by the March 2022 decision of the other seven members of the Arctic Council to pause participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.⁴⁾Pézard, S., Flanagan, S.J., Harold, S., Chindea, I.A., Sacks, B.J., Tingstad, A., Finazzo, T., Kim, S., 2022. China’s strategy and activities in the Arctic: implications for North American and Transatlantic security, Research Report. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html. Accessed 1 December 2025

China has intensified its “lawfare” approach, challenging the Council’s sovereignty frameworks by promoting alternative governance models that emphasize the Arctic as a “global commons” and a “community with a shared future”.⁵⁾Pézard, S., Flanagan, S.J., Harold, S., Chindea, I.A., Sacks, B.J., Tingstad, A., Finazzo, T., Kim, S., 2022. China’s strategy and activities in the Arctic: implications for North American and Transatlantic security, Research Report. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html. Accessed 1 December 2025 Some examples include China’s criticizing the Arctic Council as a “regionalist” institution failing to consider global interests; leveraging international legal frameworks (such as UNCLOS); and utilizing bilateral diplomacy and soft power (especially with Greenland and Iceland) to reduce resistance to China’s governance ambitions. This effectively dilutes the exclusive prerogatives of the Arctic states and the Council’s established legal order.⁶⁾Pézard, S., Flanagan, S.J., Harold, S., Chindea, I.A., Sacks, B.J., Tingstad, A., Finazzo, T., Kim, S., 2022. China’s strategy and activities in the Arctic: implications for North American and Transatlantic security, Research Report. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html. Accessed 1 December 2025 This approach, coupled with China’s increased scientific and economic footprint, pressures the Council’s authority and complicates consensus-building. The Arctic’s governing landscape is rapidly changing and characterized by gaps between international and national laws, inconsistent enforcement capabilities, and a lack of transparency, which provides fertile ground for China’s hybrid tactics to operate beneath the threshold of armed conflict, as noted by the Hybrid CoE.⁷⁾Giannopoulos, G., Theocharidou, M., 2021. The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/the-landscape-of-hybrid-threats-a-conceptual-model/. Accessed 28 October 2025 The Arctic Council’s incapacity to unify on critical security issues post-2022 has effectively created a governance vacuum that China exploits to entrench itself economically, scientifically, and politically.⁸⁾Basaran, I., 2017. The Future of Arctic Navigation: Cooperation between the international maritime organization and Arctic Council. Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce. Vol. 48, No. 1 In sum, China’s hybrid warfare strategy against the Arctic Council following the starting of the war in Ukraine reflects a deliberate effort to exploit institutional vulnerabilities, fracture consensus, and advance alternative normative orders favourable to Chinese strategic interests. In particular, China aims to advance alternative governance models like the Polar Silk Road, deepen bilateral economic ties with Russia and vulnerable Arctic states, expand scientific research with dual-use applications, and increase military capability development including icebreaker deployments and submarine knowledge gathering.⁹⁾Puranen, M., Kopra, S., 2023. China’s Arctic Strategy – a Comprehensive Approach in Times of Great Power Rivalry. Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 6, 239–253. https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.196

Changing Geopolitical Landscape

The notion of a unified “One Arctic” has splintered into two geopolitically separated spheres of influence: first, the West (through NATO); and, second, the East (with Russia and its partners, such as China).¹⁰⁾Filijovic M & Jardine S (2024) Russia’s Queenside Castling in the High North: A Strategic Risk or Opportunity for the West? 8 October, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-queenside-castling-high-north-strategic-risk-opportunity-west/. Accessed 28 October 2025 The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the process of (re)militarising the Arctic initiated by Moscow more than a decade and a half ago, did not include other actors, not even partner countries with which the Kremlin maintained close cooperation in the defence sector. Between January 2022 and June 2023, the number of Chinese-owned companies registered in the Russian-controlled Arctic surged by 87 percent compared to the previous two years, reaching a total of 234 firms.¹¹⁾Filijovic M & Jardine S (2024) Russia’s Queenside Castling in the High North: A Strategic Risk or Opportunity for the West? 8 October, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-queenside-castling-high-north-strategic-risk-opportunity-west/. Accessed 28 October 2025

NATO’s Arctic Posture Under Article 6: Reactive Rather Than Proactive

Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty defines the geographic scope of NATO’s collective defence obligations, explicitly including the North American and European Arctic.¹²⁾North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C., USA However, several structural and operational factors constrain NATO’s proactive engagement in the Arctic. First, despite increased awareness of Arctic security challenges, NATO lacks a unified and comprehensive Arctic policy that integrates diverse security dimensions, including hybrid threats and conventional military challenges across the political-military spectrum. As a defensive alliance, NATO remains reactive to traditional escalations or crises, rather than preventive. Second, geopolitical and alliance dynamics further complicate the landscape. The recent accession of Finland and Sweden expands NATO’s Arctic footprint but also intensifies the complexity of coordination. The alliance remains cautious about overt militarization in the Arctic to avoid provoking Russia, contributing to an ambiguous deterrence posture that risks under-preparation for hybrid or sub-threshold warfare. Third, there are several technological and infrastructural gaps. NATO members, including the US, face capability shortfalls such as insufficient icebreaker fleets and limited Arctic ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) assets, which impede situational awareness and rapid response capabilities. The alliance’s defensive posture becomes apparent through these gaps, which emerge as they react to China’s hybrid activities alongside Russia’s increasing militarization. The current passive approach of NATO’s Arctic strategy under Article 6 results in potential delays or inadequate responses to threats. Consequently, NATO’s Arctic posture under Article 6 is currently insufficiently proactive, risking a delayed or ineffective response.

Contextualizing NORDEFCO

Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is a regional defence cooperation platform among the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), offers a complementary mechanism with established military and security expertise and interoperability.¹³⁾Dahl, A.-S., 2024. NORDEFCO and NATO: “Smart Defence” in the North? NATO Defence College. https://www.ndc.nato.int/fr/download/nordefco-and-nato-smart-defence-in-the-north/. Accessed 1 December 2025 NORDEFCO functions as a critical platform for Nordic defense collaboration, promoting interoperability, joint exercises, and coordinated responses to emerging security threats in the Arctic and surrounding regions. NORDEFCO’s growing importance is underscored by the enhanced security cooperation among Nordic countries, including bilateral statements of intent and trilateral agreements that facilitate closer operational integration.¹⁴⁾Hong, N., 2024. How the West can navigate Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic. Institute for China-America Studies. https://chinaus-icas.org/research/how-the-west-can-navigate-sino-russian-cooperation-in-the-arctic/. Accessed on 28 October 2025

Policy Recommendations: Navigating Between Status Quo and Strategic Innovation

To address China’s hybrid warfare in the Arctic and NATO’s constrained posture, four policy pathways emerge:

Option 1: Continue Current Approach (Status Quo)

Maintaining the current fragmented and reactive posture risks further erosion of Western influence and governance coherence in the Arctic. While politically less contentious, this approach may cede strategic advantage to China and Russia, allowing hybrid threats to grow unchecked.

Option 2: Strategic Integration of NORDEFCO and NATO Security Dialogue

The strategic integration of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) with NATO’s security dialogue¹⁵⁾Dahl, A.-S., 2024. NORDEFCO and NATO: “Smart Defence” in the North? NATO Defence College. https://www.ndc.nato.int/fr/download/nordefco-and-nato-smart-defence-in-the-north/. Accessed 1 December 2025 presents a critical pathway to enhance collective defence, regional stability, and interoperability across the Nordic and Euro-Atlantic regions. This recommendation responds to the changing security environment of the Arctic and Northern Europe that demands a strong and integrated response because of Russia’s rising military presence alongside China’s strategic competition. The integration should be pursued through enhanced strategic dialogue, joint operational planning, infrastructure development, hybrid threat resilience, and inclusive engagement mechanisms, ensuring that both Nordic nations and NATO allies act cohesively in safeguarding the Euro-Atlantic security environment.¹⁶⁾Dahl, A.-S., 2024. NORDEFCO and NATO: “Smart Defence” in the North? NATO Defence College. https://www.ndc.nato.int/fr/download/nordefco-and-nato-smart-defence-in-the-north/. Accessed 1 December 2025

Option 3: NATO Develops a Dedicated Arctic Policy and Capability Framework

NATO formulating a comprehensive Arctic policy to acknowledge hybrid threats as a requirement for ensuring regional security will ensure all members and their relevant interests in securing the region are communicated. Key elements may include developing Arctic-specific doctrine that considers the evolving nature of hybrid tactics, fostering interoperability and joint exercises that integrate hybrid threat scenarios.¹⁷⁾Giannopoulos, G., Theocharidou, M., 2021. The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/the-landscape-of-hybrid-threats-a-conceptual-model/. Accessed 28 October 2025 Further, by enhancing political-military coordination among NATO members, including new members Finland and Sweden, and Arctic partners. Collaborating with civilian agencies and private sector actors, given the hybrid threat’s multi-domain nature, aligning national and alliance capabilities for a layered response.¹⁸⁾Giannopoulos, G., Theocharidou, M., 2021. The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/the-landscape-of-hybrid-threats-a-conceptual-model/. Accessed 28 October 2025 This proactive approach would better position NATO and its partners to anticipate and counter hybrid threats before there is an escalation to kinetic conflict.

Option 4: As the Arctic Council stagnates, hybrid governance, not hybrid warfare, may define the new Arctic order. China’s slow entrenchment through ‘legitimate’ channels is less a threat from outside and more a mirror to our internal incoherence

As the Arctic Council experiences stagnation and diminished effectiveness, it is imperative to recognize that the emerging Arctic order will be shaped more by hybrid governance dynamics than by overt hybrid warfare. China’s gradual expansion across the region through legitimate channels such as scientific cooperation, economic investments, and multilateral institutional participation should not be viewed solely as an external threat.¹⁹⁾Hong, N., 2024. How the West can navigate Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic. Institute for China-America Studies. https://chinaus-icas.org/research/how-the-west-can-navigate-sino-russian-cooperation-in-the-arctic/. Accessed on 28 October 2025 Rather, it reflects and exploits the internal incoherence and fragmentation among Arctic states regarding strategic priorities and governance cohesion. Arctic countries should focus on strengthening Arctic governance structures by reforming them to eliminate institutional deficiencies and improve transparency and policy coordination while ensuring inclusivity. The reinforcement of unity and consistency among Arctic nations and their partners will decrease China’s influence because its strategy depends on existing governance gaps to pursue its interests. Strengthening solidarity and coherence among Arctic states and their partners will mitigate the appeal and influence of external actors like China, whose strategy leverages the current governance deficits to advance its interests. By reframing the Arctic challenge in terms of hybrid governance rather than hybrid warfare, Arctic states can more effectively safeguard their sovereignty, uphold international law, and ensure sustainable and peaceful development in an era of increased geopolitical competition.

Conclusion

China’s hybrid warfare in the Arctic from 2022 to the present has tactically targeted the Arctic Council, exploiting governance fractures and advancing alternative normative frameworks that challenge the existing order.²⁰⁾Dyck, C., 2024. On thin ice: The Arctic Council’s uncertain future. Marine Policy, Vol 163, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2024.106060 NATO’s largely reactive posture under Article 6 risks a lack of readiness and significant consequences for allies. Addressing these challenges requires a multi-pronged approach balancing diplomatic engagement through the Arctic Council and robust military-political integration via NATO. Only through such calibrated strategies can Western interests and the rules-based Arctic order be preserved in the face of China’s comprehensive hybrid strategy.

Juliana Rapper is a graduate student in Political Science at the University of Waterloo.